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Abstract This study uses a methodology for analyzing the interdependence
effects of abandonment and renovation for proﬁt-maximizing
landlords. After using a Prisoners’ Dilemma game of
abandonment to establish the existence of the interdependence
phenomenon between internal rates of return, a Stackelberg
framework is employed to model the interdependence effects
of abandonment and renovation. The Stackelberg model
appropriately deﬁnes the timing payoffs of the landlords’
operational decisions. This model shows that as long as one
landlord does not abandon, the optimal decision for the other
landlord is to renovate their property.
Sociologist and more speciﬁcally human ecologists usually assume that if the
population size or composition of a neighborhood changes then change will follow
in the other components of the system as well. This perspective may be traced to
the conception, developed by the Chicago School urbanists, of neighborhoods as
‘‘natural areas,’’ (Schwirian, 1983).1
Urbanists and ecologists assert how a new social system can invade a
neighborhood, which may cause a succession from the old system to a new system.
With succession and the creation of new systems, changes in social characteristics,
familism2 and economic status may result in neighborhood decline. If succession
takes place, the newcomers may have no personal bond to the established
structures. Therefore, conventional upkeep and maintenance may not be a focal
concern of these immigrants. For instance, residential properties in these new
social system neighborhoods may experience blight, which may result in property
abandonment.
Housing abandonment may be optimal or suboptimal. Optimal abandonment may
occur when a property has an alternative higher and better use than its current
use, and/or it is ﬁnancially feasible to walk away from the property rather than
to sell it. This phenomenon is seen more often in seasoned properties. In general,
as the property ages, its quality declines.3 Furthermore, the initial quality of a
property may be low due to the developer using cheap building materials. Arnott,
Davidson and Pines (1983) present a theoretical model, which shows a relationship422  Simmons-Mosley
between building age and optimal abandonment for a proﬁt-maximizing landlord.
They suggest that if demolition and maintenance cost were sufﬁciently high, then
it would be optimal for a developer to construct a property, lease it for a period
of time and abandon it. Landlords, who will only hold their properties for a limited
time prior to abandoning, may be likely to trade better building materials for lower
construction cost. Inferior quality may hasten landlords to abandon. If it is not
ﬁnancially feasible for landlords to walk away, then their decision to abandon may
be suboptimal.4
This article discusses suboptimal housing abandonment, which may result in
allocative and spatial inefﬁciencies. The sources of these two economically
unpleasant outcomes may include subsidies to suburbanization, improper
implementation of property tax levies and externalities arising from poor
neighborhood infrastructure and surrounding abandoned buildings. The allocative
inefﬁciency of housing capital may result in a reduction in the size of the low-
income housing stock, and the acceleration of decentralization (suburbanization)
that can produce wasteful commuting, environmental degradation and other
problems. Besides the aforementioned allocative inefﬁciency problems,
suburbanization may lead to spatial inefﬁciency. Cars not paying their social cost
and ﬁscal zoning might be examples of this inefﬁciency, which may also result
in unequal distributions of housing locational choices across income classes. For
instance, ﬁscal zoning may exclude low-income families from more afﬂuent
neighborhoods.
According to the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau survey, there were 115,904,641
housing units within the United States and the District of Columbia. Landlords
frequently make operational decisions that affect these units. Acquiring, renovating
and disposing of property are the three primary decisions faced by landlords. The
decisions made by these landlords also affect individuals, communities and
government entities, because property values and conditions are spatially
interdependent. For instance, a renovated building might add value to a
neighborhood. Furthermore, a landlord’s divestment decision can inﬂuence the
surrounding properties in that an abandonment decision may adversely affect
adjacent property values. Suboptimal abandonment is demonstrated in a Prisoners’
Dilemma game framework and with a Stackelberg model, which illustrate the
interdependent effects of abandonment, and abandonment and renovation,
respectively. Both models support the interdependence phenomenon of how one
landlord’s abandonment and/or renovation decisions may affect the other
landlord’s proﬁt.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. First, the relationship between
suburbanization, suboptimal abandonment and renovation is examined. Next, a
Prisoners’ Dilemma game framework of abandonment is discussed. This is
followed by a Stackelberg model that is used to show optimal abandonment and
renovation strategies. Finally, concluding comments are presented.Effects of Housing Abandonment and Renovation  423
JRER  Vol. 25  No. 4 – 2003
 Suburbanization, Suboptimal Abandonment and
Renovation
This section examines the relationship between suburbanization, suboptimal
abandonment, and renovation. In that, why do suburban migrants leave behind
and discontinue supporting established communities? Government services and
attitudes may be the answer to this question. Suburbanization subsidies may hinder
central city redevelopment. Cities indirectly support suburbanization to the extent
of annexation by extending and increasing the capacity of sewer systems,
highways, roads and/or other infrastructure out to the periphery, which is
constructed for anticipated population growth. This enables developers on the
fringe of cities to be able to develop within city limits and/or incur lower
development cost, in which they pass this savings on to new suburban homebuyers.
These suburban residents are now no longer responsible for taxes in the
metropolitan area in which they probably still heavily rely on for employment,
recreational activities, social events and other daily necessities. Thus, the city loses
tax dollars from these suburban commuters, which may never be replaced as the
composition of metropolitan neighborhoods change. For instance, New York City’s
out-of-state resident’s commuter tax, which was successful in recouping lost tax
revenue was repealed in April 2000, and retroactive to July 1, 1999 for providing
refunds to commuters.
If cities were not as accommodating to annexation, then we might see more
redevelopment in the center of cities. This alternative behavior by cities might
result in lowering the number of abandoned buildings. Conversely, if
suburbanization subsidies continue to encourage households to ﬂee to the suburbs,
there might be an increase in the number of abandoned buildings. The unwanted
result for the cities might be a dramatic rise of suboptimal housing abandonment.
Thus, viable communities might ﬁzzle away.
 A Prisoners’ Dilemma Game of Abandonment
To analyze the problem of housing abandonment, consider that property values
are interdependent. The rationale underlying interdependence is that decisions
made by landlords may have a domino effect. For example, if landlord i’s
abandonment decision adversely affected landlord j’s cash ﬂows then the result is
a negative externality. Consequently, landlord j may abandon if the adverse cash
ﬂows result in insolvency.5 A repercussion of this negative externality is the
removal of both properties as tax paying entities within their respective
municipality. A decrease in taxes implies fewer resources for infrastructure
expansion and maintenance. According to O’Sullivan (1993), non-tax paying,
boarded-up and idled abandoned buildings will likely result in a deteriorated
community. Besides a decline in tax revenue, other social cost may be an increase424  Simmons-Mosley
in criminal activity within the immediate area, which may induce another landlord
to abandon due to unwanted demand shocks. Basically, tenants who have the
resources to move will not live in an undesirable location. This perpetual cycle
of unfavorable housing abandonment coupled with increased tenant mobility might
cause a continual snowball effect of neighborhood deterioration. Thus, a landlord’s
decision to abandon will affect another landlord’s decision to abandon. Exhibit 1
illustrates this situation in a Prisoners’Dilemma game. Davis and Whinston (1957)
display a similar application of a Prisoners’ Dilemma game to explain how the
interdependence of property values can cause urban blight. Following their lead,
an interdependence game of housing abandonment is developed here. The game
assumes that a landlord’s abandonment decision will have a negative effect on
another landlord’s cash ﬂows. The cash ﬂows can be translated into rates of return.
The rules of the game are outlined as follow:
 Players: The game consists of two players. The players are landlord i
and landlord j.
 Actions: The landlords’ actions are a best response to his opponents’
actions. The actions the landlords can choose are do not abandon or
abandon. The landlords’ actions are based on them being proﬁt-
maximizing individuals.
 Strategies: Landlord i’s strategies are independent of landlord j’s
strategies. The strategies are based on payoff maximization given the
opponent’s actions.
 Payoffs: The payoffs, symbolized as u, are dependent on the other
landlord’s actions. The payoffs, each internal rate of return (IRR), are in
the interior of the bi-matrix. If the landlord does not abandon then the
IRR is the ratio of cash ﬂows from operations divided by the building
value. However, if the landlord abandons then the IRR is .0 because the
landlord walked away from the property. In the bi-matrix, the values
enclosed in brackets represent IRR to landlord i and j, respectively.
Payoffs are {ui, uj}:{ui  IRR for landlord i given an action by landlord
j, uj  IRR for landlord j given an action by landlord i}.
Exhibit 1 represents the Prisoners’ Dilemma game with hypothetical payoffs. The
Nash equilibria are {.05, .05} and {.0, .0} where both landlords do not abandon
and abandon, respectively. The Nash equilibrium is deﬁned as the best mutual
response. The ﬁrst equilibrium of {.05, .05} yields the highest payoff. Therefore,
it is the most efﬁcient strategy, which consists of both landlords exercising a risk-
dominated strategy, do not abandon. The second Nash equilibrium is the maxi-
min choice, which consists of both landlords exercising their dominant strategy,
abandonment. It is the safe strategy because each landlord believes the other will
abandon. The abandonment strategy is dominant and safe because it allows the
landlords to be risk-averse by hedging their operational decision to maximize
proﬁts by minimizing potential losses.
It would seem the landlords would prefer to be at {.05, .05} verses {.0, .0} but
the risk-dominated strategy will not take place without collusion. Collusion wouldEffects of Housing Abandonment and Renovation  425
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occur if the landlords planned maximizing return strategies together. However,
the collusion of strategies will never happen in a Prisoners’ Dilemma game
because one player’s strategy is independent of the other player’s strategy. Given
landlord i does not abandon and landlord j abandons, each landlord’s IRR will be
{.02, .0} where landlord i receives a 2% return and landlord j has a 0% return.
The IRR is vice versa if landlord i abandons and landlord j does not abandon.
Thus, both landlords prefer to abandon and receive a 0% IRR instead of risking
a 2% return. However, the basis of a landlord’s decision may not contain any
policy-based incentives in the IRR calculation. Government intervention can be a
mechanism, which will provide incentives for both landlords to play (do not
abandon, do not abandon).
 Interdependence Effects of Abandonment and
Renovation
As illustrated in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game, a landlord’s bottom line proﬁti s
not only affected by their business decisions but also by the operational decisions
of adjacent property landlords. Abandonment is only one of the landlord’s choices.
Besides abandoning, a landlord may opt to reinvest in their property. In this
section, the landlord’s options are extended, which are to abandon or to renovate.
Whether the abandonment option or the renovation option is chosen, one
landlord’s decision may indirectly affect the other landlord’s proﬁts. Incorporating
the maxi-min strategy from the Prisoners’ Dilemma hypothetical example with the
renovation option leads to the next model. Following a Stackelberg framework,
the interdependence effect of housing abandonment and renovation is
mathematically illustrated. In the Stackelberg game agent i, the single landlord,
moves ﬁrst and agent j, the representative landlord,6 observes agent i’s action prior
to making a decision. In practice, a landlord’s action may inﬂuence another426  Simmons-Mosley
Exhibit 2  The First Order Conditions for the Payoff Equations
a
r   or s  = 0  a 
r   or s  = 1  r
r or s  = 1 r 
r or s  = 0
π r: -c  
π s: -c  
π r: none  π r: d  
π s: d   π s: none 
π r: none 
π s: none
landlord’s operational decision. The solution to Stackelberg games has a
backward-induction outcome. The timing of the game is as follows:
 A single landlord, s, chooses to abandon (as  0), not to abandon
(as  1), to renovate (rs  1) or not to renovate (rs  0).
 A representative landlord, r, then chooses to abandon, (ar  0), not to
abandon (ar  1), to renovate (rr  1) or not to renovate (rr  0).
 The payoff to the single and representative landlords is their proﬁt, which
incorporates the interdependence effect.
For instance, the payoff to the representative landlord is:
 (a , r , a , r )  a [  rb c(a  1)  rd], (1) rr r s s r r p r s s
where the representative landlord’s proﬁt, r, is a function of the abandonment
and renovation decisions of both s and r. rp is the landlord’s proﬁt prior to the
renovation decision and the interdependence effects by the single landlord. The
term rrb reﬂects the increase in r if the landlord chooses to renovate where b is
an arbitrary dollar amount. c(as  1) and rsd represent the interdependent effects
of abandonment and renovation, respectively, where c and d are arbitrary dollar
amounts. Given the representative landlord does not abandon and if as  1, then
the interdependent effect of abandonment is not adverse to r; however, if
as  0, then r is reduced by c. In the event that ar  1 and rs  1, then the
single landlord’s renovation decision will have a positive effect on r. However,
if the representative landlord exercises the abandonment option where ar  0i n
Equation (1), then their proﬁts will be 0, regardless of the single landlord’s
abandonment and renovation decisions. The interdependence equation, can
similarly represent the single landlord’s proﬁts where s (ar, rr, as, rs)  as
[sp  rsb  c(ar  1)  rrd].
Exhibit 2 summarizes the ﬁrst order conditions for the payoff equations as the
interdependence effects on r and s. These effects, which may affect the
landlord’s proﬁt, will aid in determining their operational decision. In equilibrium,Effects of Housing Abandonment and Renovation  427
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Exhibit 3  The Landlords’ Proﬁt-Maximizing Optimal Abandonment and Renovation Decisions
Scenario A
rr = 1, ar = 1 
Scenario B  Scenario C 
renovate  renovate 
abandon 





rr = 0, ar = 1  ar = 0 
rs = 1, as = 1 
rs = 0, as = 1 
as = 0
both landlords will have the same decision. Each cell in Exhibit 3 symmetrically
depicts the single and representative landlords’ proﬁt-maximizing optimal
abandonment and renovation decisions in response to each other’s operational
decision.
Suppose the single landlord exercises as  1 and rs  1, then under optimality
the representative landlord will exercise the same options, ar  1 and rr  1.
Since the proﬁt prior to renovation and the interdependence effects is rp  r 
$1000, the landlord obtains outside capital to renovate the building. The
renovations include painting the outside of the building, replacing broken
windows, planting ﬂowers at the building’s entrance, and updating kitchen and
bathroom ﬁxtures in every unit. Although the renovations are not extensive, they
do make the building more appealing within the community. Given this
hypothetical example, rrb increases r by $8000. Due to increased demand for
the representative landlord’s property, rents are raised. Also, the landlord beneﬁts
from the single landlord’s as  1 and rs  1 operational decision by receiving a
positive externality of rsd  $2000. Therefore, prior to renovations by both
landlords, rp  r  $1000. After renovations r  $11000.
As illustrated in Exhibit 3, it is optimal for a landlord to renovate as long as the
other landlord does not abandon. If the representative owner did not renovate after
the single owner decided to renovate, then the representative owner would have
exercised a suboptimal decision. This suboptimal decision can be illustrated in
Equation (1) where a negative value of rsd signals that the representative owner
experienced a negative interdependent effect from the single and representative
landlords exercising as  1 and rs  1 and ar  1 and rr  0, respectively. Instead
of rsd increasing r by $2000, it may have decreased r by $2000. Therefore,
when interdependence is not considered, a landlord’s decision may not be optimal,
which can result in an unfavorable outcome for a landlord.
Another instance of suboptimal decision can be interpreted by analyzing Exhibits
2 and 3. In Exhibit 2, rs  0 and as  1 imply that the single landlord should428  Simmons-Mosley
not renovate and not abandon; however in Exhibit 3, under the interdependence
scenarios A, B and C for rs  0 and as  1, the optimal decisions are renovate,
renovate and abandon, respectively. Similarly, if the single landlord abandons then
it is optimal for the representative landlord to abandon as well. This rationale is
part of an underlying assumption of the model, such that if the single landlord
renovates then the representative landlord will not abandon, and if the
representative landlord abandons then the single landlord will not renovate.
 Conclusion
By understanding the interdependence phenomenon between landlords, policy
makers can better promote efﬁciency in the housing market. Policies that focus
on providing landlords with incentives not to abandon when abandonment is not
socially optimal may be beneﬁcial in preserving communities. Rational decision-
making landlords faced with policy-based incentives that deter abandonment will
not exercise their option to abandon when it is suboptimal.
As shown in the Prisoners’ Dilemma hypothetical example, suboptimal
abandonment occurs when there is no collusion of strategies between landlords.
Abandonment is suboptimal because both landlords receive a lower IRR by
abandoning. Contrarily, they both realize a higher IRR by not exercising their
abandonment option.
Since landlords base their operational decisions on asymmetric information7 in
the Prisoners’ Dilemma framework, policies should focus on non-collusive
strategies. The Stackelberg’s sequential framework suggests an alternate choice to
the Prisoners’ Dilemma Nash equilibrium mini-max dominant strategy of both
landlords abandoning, which is that both landlords renovate. In equilibrium, the
Stackelberg model shows renovation discourages the mini-max choice, and a
landlord subsequently encourages another landlord to renovate. Therefore, policies
that do not necessitate collusion such as renovation could decrease the rate of
abandonment. These policies can serve as a mutual agent to landlords by creating
a positive interdependent Stackelberg effect.
Low-income communities can beneﬁt the most from policy-based incentives for
landlords. The results of fewer abandon buildings coupled with better-managed
buildings are less criminal activity, more businesses operating within the
community to service the residents’ needs and low-income communities making
an important contribution to the betterment of society.
 Endnotes
1 Natural areas entail: (1) a geographic area physically distinguishable from other adjacent
areas; (2) a population with unique social, demographic or ethnic composition; (3) a
social system with rules, norms and regularly recurring patterns of social interaction thatEffects of Housing Abandonment and Renovation  429
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function as mechanisms of social control; and (4) aggregate emergent behaviors or ways
of life that distinguish the area from others around it.
2 Familism is sometimes referred to as urbanism.
3 Paris, France is one exception to this statement.
4 See Stegman and Rasmussen (1980) for a further discussion of suboptimal abandonment.
5 Abandonment is more probable when the property value is less than the amount of liens
on the property (see Scaﬁdi, Schill, Wachter and Culhane, 1998). If not, a distressed sale
may occur.
6 The representative landlord denotes the ‘‘other’’ landlord.
7 They do not have knowledge of each other’s investment strategies.
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